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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Alfredo Cabrera appeals, contending that the district court erred by denying his 
motion to suppress. Specifically, he asserts that his arrest for obstructing a police 
officer was unlawful because the statement upon which that arrest was premised did not 
actually constitute obstruction under the statute. He also contends that, because the 
arrest was unlawful, the search incident to that arrest was unreasonable. Therefore, he 
asserts that the fruits of that warrantless search, which served as the basis for the 
current charge (possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine)), should be 
suppressed. Because the district court's decision denying Mr. Cabrera's motion to 
suppress that evidence was erroneous, this Court should reverse the district court's 
order, vacate Mr. Cabrera's conviction, and remand the case for further proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Officer Travis Debie was asked to locate Alejandro Gordobea, 1 who was 
allegedly sending threatening text messages to a third party; Officer Debie's intent was 
to tell Mr. Gordobea to stop sending threatening messages. (Tr., Vol.1, p.7, Ls.12-16.)2 
Officer Debie went to the dairy where Mr. Gordobea, was reported to work, and started 
by looking in the milk barn. (Tr., Vol.1, p.8, Ls.4-5.) There, Officer Debie encountered 
1 At the evidentiary hearing on Mr. Cabrera's motion to suppress, Officer Debie 
erroneously referred to Mr. Gordobea as "Alejandro Cordova." (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, 
f·7, Ls.14-15.) 
The transcripts in this case were provided in two separately bound and paginated 
volumes. To avoid confusion, "Vol.1" will refer to the volume containing the transcripts 
of the hearing on the motion to suppress and the change of plea hearing, which was 
provided in the digital file "41510 Cabrera Reporter's Transcript on Appeal." "Vol.2" will 
refer to the volume containing the transcripts of the sentencing hearing, which was 
provided in the digital file "41510 Cabrera Suppl Reporter's Transcript on Appeal PDF." 
1 
two men, told them why he was there, and asked if either knew Mr. Gordobea. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.8, Ls.9-2·1.) Both men denied knowing Mr. Gordobea, and said they 
thought he lived in the apartments on the dairy. (Tr., Vol.1, p.8, L.24 - p.9, L.2.) Officer 
Debie left the milk barn and continued to look for Mr. Gordobea. (Tr., Vol.1, p.10, 
Ls.10-12.) As he did so, he met the dairy foreperson, who told him that Mr. Gordobea 
should be working in the milk barn. (Tr., Vol.1, p.10, Ls.18-19.) When the officer told 
the foreperson what had happened in the milk barn, the foreperson gave a description 
of Mr. Gordobea which matched one of the two men in the milk barn. (Tr., Vol.1, p.10, 
Ls.17-22.) Officer Debie returned to the milk barn with the foreperson, and the 
foreperson saw that Mr. Gordobea was running away from the milk barn. (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.11, Ls.4-8.) However, the second man - who turned out to be Alfredo Cabrera - was 
still there, although he, too, was leaving the milk barn. (Tr., Vol.1, p.11, Ls.9-10.) 
Officer Debie asked to speak with him. (Tr., Vol.1, p.11, Ls.10-11.) When the 
Mr. Cabrera continued to head for the door, Officer Debie ordered him to stop, and 
Mr. Cabrera complied with that order. (Tr., Vol.1, p.11, Ls.10-15.) 
Officer Debie questioned Mr. Cabrera, who admitted that he was, in fact, good 
friends with Mr. Gordobea, that they both lived in the apartments on the dairy, and they 
had lied because they were concerned that Mr. Gordobea was about to be deported. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.11, Ls.18-25.) After that confession, Officer Debie placed Mr. Cabrera 
under arrest for obstructing a peace officer. (Tr., Vol.1, p.12, Ls.2-4.) Officer Debie 
then performed a pat down search of Mr. Cabrera and, in his jacket pocket, found a 
glass pipe with residue in it. (Tr., Vol.1, p.12, Ls.11-16; R., p.11.) Mr. Cabrera admitted 
the jacket was his, though he stated that the pipe belonged to Mr. Gordobea. (R., p.11.) 
Mr. Cabrera subsequently admitted that he had used the pipe to smoke 
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methamphetamine. (R., p.11.) Officer Debie arrested Mr. Cabrera for possession of 
methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and obstruction. (R., p.11.) 
The State charged Mr. Cabrera with possession of methamphetamine.3 
(R., pp.40-41.) Mr. Cabrera filed a motion to suppress the evidence found during the 
pat down search, arguing that the arrest was invalid, and therefore, the warrantless 
search was unreasonable. (R., pp.54-56.) After an evidentiary hearing, the district 
court concluded that Mr. Cabrera's statement constituted obstruction under I.C. § 18-
705, and, therefore, his arrest was proper, and the search was reasonable. (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.21, L.11 - p.23, L.4.) However, the district court did reject the State's alternative 
argument - that I.C. § 18-5413(2), which criminalizes knowingly giving false information 
to an officer who is investigating the commission of a crime, justified the arrest in this 
case - because the district court determined, as a matter of fact, that Officer Debie was 
not involved in an investigation when Mr. Cabrera made his false statement. (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.23, Ls.5-18.) As such, it denied Mr. Cabrera's motion to suppress based on its ruling 
that the arrest was authorized by I.C. § 18-705. (R., p.88.) 
Mr. Cabrera subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea, which preserved his 
right to challenge the district court's order on his motion to suppress on appeal. 
(R., pp.127-28; Tr., Vol.2, p.13, Ls.14-20.) The district court imposed a unified sentence 
of six years, with two years fixed, which it suspended for a three-year period of 
probation. (R., p.186.) Mr. Cabrera filed a timely notice of appeal from that judgment. 
(R., pp.211-13.) 
3 According to the online repository, the separate misdemeanor charges for obstruction 
and possession of paraphernalia (Twin Falls County No. CR 2013-1235) have been 
dismissed on the motion of the prosecutor. 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Cabrera's motion to suppress the 
evidence found during the search incident to arrest since the arrest was unlawful. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Cabrera's Motion To Suppress The Evidence 
Found During The Search Incident To Arrest Since The Arrest Was Unlawful 
A. If The Arrest Was Unlawful, The Search Incident To Arrest Exception To The 
Warrant Requirement Does Not Apply And The Fruits Of Such A Search Should 
Be Suppressed 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 'The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961 ); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 
516, 524 (1986). The Idaho Constitution provides its own, similar protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. lDAHOCONST. Art. I,§ 17; State v. Donato, 135 
Idaho 469, 471 (2001 ). 
A unanimous United States Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches 
are per se unreasonable. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). Therefore, a 
warrantless search is presumed to violate the Fourth Amendment, unless the State 
demonstrates that one of the exceptional, well-established, and well-delineated 
exceptions to this requirement is applicable to the facts. Id. at 390-91; see also State v. 
Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 503-04 (1999) (holding the same standard applies to Art. I,§ 17 
of the Idaho Constitution). 
The only exception to the warrant requirement at issue in this case is the search 
incident to arrest exception. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the justifications 
for that exception are: 
(1) Police officers when making a valid arrest need to secure their own 
safety by searching out and removing any weapons on the person of the 
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arrestee, or within an area under his control, and (2) there is a need to 
search for and seize evidence that is located on the person of the arrestee 
or within his immediate control to prevent the destruction of that evidence. 
See Chime/ v. California [395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969)]. 
State v. Smith, 120 Idaho 77, 81 (1991) (quoting State v. Calegar, 104 Idaho 526, 529 
(1983)). One of the prerequisites for this exception is that the search is conducted 
following "a valid arrest." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, if the arrest was unlawful or 
otherwise invalid, then the search incident to arrest is not objectively reasonable, and, 
therefore, that exception will not justify the warrantless search. State v. Bishop, 146 
Idaho 804, 821 (2009) (holding that the officer "did not have probable cause to arrest 
Bishop for obstructing an officer, the arrest was unlawful, and the evidence obtained 
during a search incident to that arrest should have been excluded"). Thus, as in Bishop, 
if Mr. Cabrera is correct that his arrest for obstruction was unlawful, the evidence 
discovered during the search incident to that arrest should have been suppressed. 
Neither I.C. § 18-705 nor I.C. § 18-5413(2) justifies the arrest in this case, and 
therefore, it was unlawful. 
B. The Arrest Of Mr. Cabrera For Obstruction Was Not Lawful Under I.C. § 18-705 
Obstructing an officer is governed by I.C. § 18-705, which provides: 
Every person who wilfully [sic] resists, delays or obstructs any public 
officer, in the discharge, or attempt to discharge, of any duty of his office 
or who knowingly gives a false report to any peace officer, when no other 
punishment is prescribed, is punishable by a fine not exceeding one 
thousand dollars ($1,000), and imprisonment in the county jail not 
exceeding one (1) year. 
I. C. § 18-705. Idaho's courts have determined that the elements of that offense are: 
(1) the defendant did resist, delay, or obstruct the officer; (2) the defendant knew that 
the person he was encountering was an officer; and (3) the defendant knew that the 
officer was attempting to perform some official act or duty. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 816; 
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State v. Adams, 138 Idaho 624, 629 (Ct. App. 2003). Mr. Cabrera does not contend 
that he did not know the person he was encountering was an officer, nor does he 
contend that the officer was not attempting to perform some official act or duty. Rather, 
he contends that there are two reasons why his statement did not obstruct the officer as 
required by the first element. First, when a false statement has no more effect on the 
investigation than remaining silent, the false statement does not constitute "obstruction." 
State v. Brandstetter, 127 Idaho 885, 887-88 (Ct. App. 1995). Second, a false 
statement does not constitute a false report, such that it would be "obstructing" under 
the statute, if the encounter was initiated by the officer. See id. 
In Brandstetter, officers executed a search warrant on the defendant's law firm to 
locate a safe potentially related to a money laundering investigation. Brandstetter, 127 
Idaho at 886. During that search, officers asked the defendant about the safe and its 
location, and the defendant responded to those questions by denying knowledge of 
either the safe or its location. Id. Police ultimately discovered the safe in an alley 
behind the law firm. Id. They charged the defendant with obstructing based on his false 
statements. Id. 
The district court in Brandstetter reviewed I.C. § 18-705 and determined that the 
expressly-identified crime - knowingly giving a false report - gave context to the 
statute's general language - willfully resisting, delaying or obstructing an officer. 
Brandstetter, 127 Idaho at 887-88. The district court also determined that, in order to 
give a false report, the declarant would have to come forward independently; if his 
statement was in response to police questioning, it would not be a report, as 
contemplated by the statute. Id. Therefore, the district court ruled that the defendant 
could not be guilty of obstructing, even though he had made a false statement, because 
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his statement was made in response to police questioning. Id. at 888. As the State did 
not challenge the district court's reasoning on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
the district court's decision. Id. The Court of Appeals also held, in response to the 
argument that the State did make on appeal, that the defendant's false statement did 
not obstruct the investigation because that "deliberate falsification was no more 
obstructive than would have been [the defendant's] silence." Id. Mr. Cabrera contends 
that, under either rationale discussed in Brandstetter, his statement to Officer Debie did 
not constitute obstruction. 
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to note that Mr. Cabrera could have stood 
silent during the initial encounter with Officer Debie. When an officer and a member of 
the public have a consensual encounter, "[t]he person approached, however, need not 
answer any question put to him; indeed he may decline to listen to the questions at all 
and may go on his way." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983). Officer Debie 
did not restrict Mr. Cabrera's movements during the encounter, nor did he make any 
display (drawing a weapon, for example) that would have indicated that Mr. Cabrera 
was not free to leave. (See generally R., Tr.) Therefore, the initial encounter was a 
consensual encounter. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 844 (2004) (holding that an 
officer merely asking questions of individuals only creates a consensual encounter). 
Because it was a consensual encounter, Mr. Cabrera would have been perfectly free to 
ignore Officer Debie's questions and remain silent. 
Had Mr. Cabrera remained silent, Officer Debie's investigation would have still 
taken the same track as it did after Mr. Cabrera made his false statement - the officer 
would have continued to look around the dairy for Mr. Gordobea, seeking to locate 
another dairy employee who could identify Mr. Gordobea, and, upon uncovering more 
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information, the officer would have returned to the milk barn to try to confront 
Mr. Gordobea. While it is true that "defendant's truthful cooperation would have saved 
investigating authorities some time and effort," that is not sufficient to make the false 
statements "obstructing." United States v. Williams, 952 F.2d 1504, 1516 (6th Cir. 
1991 ). Therefore, under Brandstetter, Mr. Cabrera's false statement was no more 
obstructive than would have been his silence, and therefore, his false statement did not 
constitute obstruction under I.C. § 18-705. 
The district court attempted to distinguish Brandstetter on the basis that the 
defendant in Brandstetter was making statements "about conduct that involved himself," 
whereas Mr. Cabrera was not personally implicated by the officer's questions. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.21, L.18 - p.22, L.22.) The district court based this on its belief that the 
denial of knowledge constitutes an invocation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment right 
to not incriminate himself. Therefore, under the district court's perspective, the 
defendant in Brandstetter was invoking his Fifth Amendment right whereas, "[i]n this 
case I believe that Mr. Cabrera did not have a Fifth Amendment right not to lie to the 
officer about his friend, that had he been implicating himself in some criminal activity, he 
would have that right .... " (Tr., Vol.1, p.22, Ls.15-19 (emphasis added). 
The district court's conclusion in that regard is directly contrary to United States 
Supreme Court precedent. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1998) 
(holding that defendants do not have a Fifth Amendment right to make that sort of 
"exculpatory no" statement to officers; they can either answer truthfully or stand silent).4 
4 The district court was correct insofar as there is not a Fifth Amendment right to lie, 
regardless of whether the defendant may have been implicated by the question. 
Brogan, 522 U.S. 404-05 ("Proper invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination allows a witness to remain silent, but not to swear 
falsely.") (internal quotation omitted). 
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However, while the holding in Brogan rejects the district court's purported distinction 
between this case and Brandstetter, it does not dictate the ultimate result in this case. 
The Brogan Court was assessing a claim under the Fifth Amendment and interpreting a 
federal statute, whereas, in this case, Mr. Cabrera is raising a Fourth Amendment claim 
pursuant to an Idaho statute. 
In regard to the scope of Idaho's statute, the only type of specific conduct 
criminalized in I.C. § 18-705 is "knowing giv[ing] a false report." As the district court in 
Brandstetter pointed out, that language gives context to the otherwise-ambiguous, 
broad terms of the statute. Brandstetter, 127 Idaho at 887-88. The Brandstetter district 
court's analysis comports with the established maxim of statutory construction of 
noscitur a sociis ("a word is known by the company it keeps"). State v. Schulz, 151 
Idaho 863, 868 (2011) (quoting State v. Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816, 821 (2000), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 893 (2004 )). Under this 
maxim, the context created by the terms surrounding a broad term, (especially when the 
broad term would otherwise be subject to several reasonable interpretations), limits the 
scope of the broad term. See id. In that case, the terms of the statute are limited to the 
scope of their common features. See id. 
For example, in Schulz, the Idaho Supreme Court was examining the definition of 
the term "co-habiting." Schulz, 151 Idaho at 866-67. While that term, by itself, may 
have been ambiguous, it was surrounded by other terms in the statute which all shared 
the common feature of an "intimate relationship." Id. at 867. Therefore, applying 
noscitur a sociis, the Supreme Court determined that "co- habiting" was limited in its 
scope in that statute to denote a scenario where the parties were living together in an 
intimate relationship. Id. 
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In Brandstetter, the district court determined that the common feature between 
the broad and specific terms of I.C. § 18-705 was volunteering untruthful information to 
officers, not speaking in response to an officer's questions. Id. Idaho precedents 
suggest, though have not yet expressly held, that the Brandstetter district court's 
conclusion to that effect is correct. See, e.g., Brandstetter, 127 Idaho at 888 (affirming 
the district court's decision without any criticism of its analysis of the statute); see also 
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 813 ("[B]y reporting the tip to Chief Miller, Kelley subjected himself 
to possible criminal liability under Idaho Code section 18-705, which makes it a crime to 
'knowingly give[] a false report to any peace officer."') (emphasis added). 
While Idaho courts have not expressly reached that conclusion, other courts 
have interpreted similar statutes in the same way the Brandstetter district court 
interpreted Idaho's obstruction statute. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gettemy, 591 A.2d 
320, 323 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (reaffirmed on this conclusion, and subsequently 
distinguished factually on this point, by Commonwealth v. Feese, 79 A.3d 1101, 1124-
25 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013)); see also Lisa Kern Griffin, Criminal Lying, Prosecutorial 
Power, and Social Meaning, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1515, 1563 n.261 (2009) (listing decisions 
from several other state courts which have reached this same conclusion). In one 
particularly noteworthy case, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed a Tennessee 
Court of Appeals decision which adopted this rule. State v. Levandowski, 955 S.W.2d 
603, 605 (Tenn. 1997). The Tennessee Court of Appeals had been persuaded to that 
conclusion by the analysis in the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in Brandstetter. 
State v. Levandowski, 1996 WL 315807, *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 1996). 
However, the Tennessee Supreme Court recently had cause to review that 
decision, and determined that the Levandowski analysis no longer controls because the 
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Tennessee Legislature amended the statute specifically to broaden its scope in 
response to the Levandowski decision. State v. Smith, S.W.3d 2014 WL 
2766674, **12-13 (Tenn. June 19, 2014). Given the similarities between I.C. § 18-705 
and the Levandowski version of Tennessee's statute,5 this Court should reach a similar 
conclusion to Levandowski. After all, as the Idaho Supreme Court recently explained, 
when the language of the statute is unambiguous, it is the province of the Legislature, 
not the Judiciary, to amend the statute. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 
Idaho 889, 892-93 (2011 ). If the Idaho Legislature desires the statute to be broader 
5 The Tennessee statute in effect at the time of the Levandowski decision provided: 
It is unlawful for any person to: 
(1) Report to a law enforcement officer an offense or incident within the 
officer's concern: 
(A) Knowing the offense or incident did not occur; or 
(B) Knowing the person reporting has no information relating to the 
offense or incident; or 
(C) Knowing the information relating to the offense is false; or 
(2) Intentionally initiate or circulate a report of a past, present, or 
impending bombing, fire, or other emergency, knowing that the report is 
false or baseless and knowing: 
(A) It will cause action of any sort by an official or volunteer agency 
organized to deal with those emergencies; or 
(B) It will place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or 
(C) It will prevent or interrupt the occupation of any building, place 
of assembly, form of conveyance, or any other place to which the 
public has access. 
Smith,_ S.W.3d _, 2014 WL 2766674, 12-13 (quoting Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-16-
502(a) (1991 )). The Levandowski Court was specifically analyzing Section 1 (C) of that 
statute. Levandowski, 955 S.W.2d at 604. 
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than its current, plain language, it should, like its counterpart in Tennessee, amend the 
statute to broaden its scope. Therefore, since the district court's interpretation of 
I.C. § 18-705 in Brandstetter is sound, it should be expressly adopted by this Court. 
Thus, under either rule from Brandstetter - that the statement was no more 
obstructing than silence would have been, or that the statement was in response to 
police questioning - the arrest of Mr. Cabrera was not lawful under I.C. § 18-705, and 
therefore, the warrantless search was unreasonable. 
C. The Arrest Of Mr. Cabrera Was Not Lawful Under I.C. § 18-5413(2) 
The State's other argument to the district court was that the arrest could be 
justified under I.C. §18-5413. That statute provides, in the relevant part: 
A person is guilty of a misdemeanor if he knowingly gives or causes to be 
given false information regarding his or another's identity to any law 
enforcement officer investigating the commission of an offense. 
I.C. § 18-5413(2). However, that statute does not apply in this situation because the 
district court determined, as a matter of fact, that Officer Debie did not begin an 
investigation when he responded to the request that he tell Mr. Gordobea to stop 
sending threatening text messages. (Tr., Vol.1, p.23, Ls.5-18; see Tr., Vol.1, p.7, 
Ls.12-23 (Officer Debie describing the request as "[Twin Falls Police Department] 
simply wanted me to make contact with [Mr. Gordobea] and request that he stop 
sending threatening text message[s]").) Since the district court's finding of fact was 
based on the substantial and competent evidence in Officer Debie's testimony, this 
Court should not disturb that factual finding on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Mathews, 133 
Idaho 300, 304 (1999). As a result of that factual finding, the district court appropriately 
concluded that I.C. §18-5413(2) was inapplicable to this case. 
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Therefore, I.C. §18-5413(2) does not justify Mr. Cabrera's arrest, and thus, the 
warrantless search was unreasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Cabrera respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his motion to suppress, vacate his conviction, and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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